Berthoff, Ann E. “Green Glasses, the Figure Bass, and the Brakeshoe.” The Mysterious Barricades: Language and Its Limits. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 159-65. Print. Summary:Berthoff’s chapter “Green Glasses, the Figured Bass, and the Breakshoe” considers language and how the elements of thought, speech, and discourse work together. The reference to the bass reinforces the idea that the harmony created through these pieces is only made through community and they can not happen individually. She also mentions that sometimes when trying to work through a blockage (like in writing) one should shift modes, for example to talking with someone. Throughout the piece Berthoff uses the example of Kleist and his positivist view as the impetus for his suicide in that it would not allow him to find the Truth he sought.Response:The breakshoe was the concept I’d had the most trouble with. In the beginning I only saw how it could be a hinderance on language creation because when thinking of a car, I only considered the break in the most obvious and literal use. In class, however, I saw that without the limits of the breakshoe (or language) it hindered by not allowing the user to take risks (or drive fast in the break analogy). The Kant-Crisis story of the green glasses was one I had not heard before, but it reminded me of the first time I realized that my notion of color was not based on objective knowledge but on associations. What I perceive as blue is only blue because I think of it in relation to things I’m told are blue (the sky, ocean, blueberries). In a similar way, his story about the green glasses challenges the notion that what we think of as truth is “really truth” or the appearance as we see it (in this case through the lens, which would include metaphorical cultural lens, etc.).Connections/Questions:The give and take of the breakshoe reminded me of the centripetal and centrifugal forces we talked about with Bakhtin. When we discussed it we also considered how those forces at play are a part of what makes the language process dynamic and living. It also creates a tension between the two in which language can work. She clearly connects to Vygotsky with the breakshoe example, but even before then it was evident in that meaning was an important element in this piece. She also references Cassier when she states that “the logic of necessity informs any philosophy of representation which recognizes the heuristic power of form” (165). |
Quotations:“A brake is required to control speed: a certain energy and rapid forwardness, then, is necessary if the heuristic power of discourse is to be exploited” (159). “Of course, all speech (and all thought) presupposes a social context, but that is not to say that Kleist is making a plea for the central importance of the concept of “audience.” His point is, rather, a matter not of rhetoric but of logic: the analysis appropriate to the relationship of language and thought must begin not with one or the other but (as Vygotsky has it) with “the unit of meaning,” with what language and thought create in their peculiar interdependence” (160). “The wheel and the brakeshoe working together probably signified to Kleist not mediation but immediacy” (161). |
